The Eastern Fleet and the Indian Ocean, 1942-1944: The Fleet that Had to Hide

Product Information

Senior Royal Navy appointments" . http://www.gulabin.com/armynavy/pdf/Senior%20Royal%20Navy%20Appointments%201900-.pdf . Retrieved 2 September 2012. Heathcote, Tony (2002). The British Admirals of the Fleet 1734 - 1995. Pen & Sword Ltd. ISBN 0-85052-835-6. Eastern Fleet comes in our Playbook format: everything you need to play, except dice, inside a book.

The book clearly reveals how weak the British presence was in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Singapore's rapid surrender and the destruction of the Prince of Wales and Repulse leaves only a skeletal naval presence at Ceylon. Inferior carrier based aircraft further weakens what little strike capabilities that could be considered against Japanese advances.On 31 March Somerville decided to divide the Fleet into two: Force A and Force B. Force A consisted of the battleship Warspite, the aircraft carriers HMS Indomitable, and HMS Formidable, and three cruisers. [14] Force B was based around the slow Revenge-class battleships of the 3rd Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Algernon Willis. Neither individually nor together could the two Eastern Fleet forces challenge a determined Japanese naval assault. Heathcote, T. A. (2002). British Admirals of the Fleet: 1734–1995. Barnsley, England: Pen and Sword. p.187. ISBN 9780850528350. L'Indochine française pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale". Archived from the original on 5 February 2012 . Retrieved 2 September 2012. Nagumo's leadership has been characterized by Andrew Boyd as rigid and unimaginative, and contributed to the escape of the British Eastern Fleet. The manoeuvring of his fleet was mainly to facilitate strikes on Colombo and Trincomalee; the possibility that the enemy might be at sea was apparently not seriously considered. He failed to appreciate that the direction that Dorsetshire's force was sailing, and the later appearance of British carrier-based aircraft, were related. Furthermore, due to limited aerial reconnaissance, Nagumo had little concrete information of what was around him, especially to his front and exposed flanks. He was not served by the confidence that there was nothing else to be found outside of the few searches made. [6] When Fuchida arrived, Hermes was already sinking. He noticed Lieutenant Shokei Yamada, who led the Akagi’s dive bombers, gesticulating urgently, so Fuchida flew alongside his plane. Yamada pointed at his nose, then downward, and smiled. Fuchida followed the finger and found the Vampire sinking. Fuchida understood. Yamada had his heart set on bombing the carrier, and rather than waste his bomb, had dropped it on the destroyer instead.

On 10 June 1940, the entry of Italy into the war introduced a new threat to the oil supply routes from the Persian Gulf, which passed through the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. The Italians controlled ports in Italian East Africa and Tiensin, China. The Italian Royal Navy ( Regia Marina) presence in the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and the western Pacific Ocean consisted of destroyers, submarines, and a small number of armed merchantmen. The majority of these were based at Massawa in Eritrea as part of the Italian Red Sea Flotilla, primarily seven destroyers and eight submarines. Damage to British destroyers at this time included HMS Kimberley which was crippled by Italian shore batteries. [6] Admiral Sir Arthur J. Power hoisted his flag in H.M.S. CARADOC at Colombo as Commander in Chief East Indies Fleet on November 22md 1944. This fleet would operate in the Indian Ocean providing trade protection for convoys and conduct combat operations against the Japanese in Burma and Malaya. The Japanese air search on the morning of 9 April was limited as on 5 April, as British carriers were no longer expected. [8]

Customer reviews

At about 16:00 on 4 April, PBY Catalina flying boat (AJ155/QL-A) from the Royal Canadian Air Force's (RCAF) 413 Squadron flown by Squadron Leader Leonard Birchall spotted Nagumo's fleet 360 mi (310 nmi; 580 km) south-east of Ceylon [20] [21] on a course that would have entered Somerville's previous patrol area from the south. [23] The Catalina transmitted the sighting, but not the size of the fleet, before being shot down. [21] At this time, Somerville was refuelling at Port T; Force A sailed eastward toward the Japanese upon receiving the sighting; [10] Force B could not be ready until 5 April. [19] Catalina FV-R from 205 Squadron RAF took off at 17:45 to shadow the Japanese fleet, making its first report at 22:37 on 4 April, and a final report at 06:15 on 5 April while 110 mi (96 nmi; 180 km) from Ceylon. FV-R was shot down about 90 minutes after the final report. [20] We are informed about a few naval actions, Japanese and British carrier strikes and about submarine operations. All very interesting and with details that explain why things ended up like they did. But the most surprising thing is that apart from submarine warfare against German, Japanese and Italian submarines very little of surface warfare actually took place. If this book is correct the Japanese navy only did one major operation in the Indian Ocean. On the other hand the Eastern Fleet as well only did a few operations and all of them in 1944. Apart from the Eastern Fleet battle forces, it also included a submarine force, to hinder Japan from using sea lanes between Burma and Singapore; and a large supporting escort force, responsible for protecting convoy roues between Suez ( Red Sea) and India, and between the Cape of Good Hope and India. [19] The author was unknown to me. He has written a number of books before, but none on a naval subject like this. His writing flows well, and this book is much easier to read than anything I write will ever be. The Royal New Zealand Navy, Chapter 23 "The New Zealand Cruisers", Sydney David Waters, Historical Publications Branch, Wellington (Part of: The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–1945)

Stuart, Rob (2006). "Leonard Birchall and the Japanese Raid on Colombo". Canadian Military Journal. Department of National Defence of Canada. 7 (4) . Retrieved 4 January 2021. Rear-Admiral, Commanding, 5th Cruiser Squadron and Second-in-Command, East Indies Fleet/Far East Fleet [ edit ] Watson, Graham (12 July 2015). "Royal Navy Organisation and Ship Deployment 1947–2013:1. ROYAL NAVY ORGANISATION AND DEPLOYMENT FROM 1947". naval-history.net. Gordon Smith . Retrieved 10 July 2018. The reinforcement of the British Eastern Fleet depended on transfers from Britain and the Mediterranean, a reflection of active warzones and the demands on the Royal Navy's (RN) resources.

Summary

Grove, Eric (1987). Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy Since World War II. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-0870215520. Secret Port T on Addu atoll Maldives 1945". Maldives Culture . http://www.maldivesculture.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=46&Itemid=58 . Retrieved 2 September 2012. L, Klemen (1999–2000). "Allied Merchant Ship Losses in the Pacific and Southeast Asia". Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941–1942. So to conceal the Eastern Fleet, Somerville created a secret base at Addu Atoll in the Maldive Islands. Here, at the secret Port T—a “Scapa Flow with palm trees”—Somerville concealed his supplies and support vessels. Roskill, Stephen (1956). War at Sea 1939-1945, Volume II, the Period of Balance. United Kingdom Military Series. London: HMSO . Retrieved 2 September 2015.