276°
Posted 20 hours ago

Revell 04736 Space Shuttle Discovery & Booster Rockets 1:144 Scale Unbuilt/Unpainted Plastic Model Kit, Multi-color, 59.5 x 36.4 x 6.5 centimetres

£21.495£42.99Clearance
ZTS2023's avatar
Shared by
ZTS2023
Joined in 2023
82
63

About this deal

Let’s face it, space is a risky business,” commented former Apollo safety officer Cohen. “I always considered every launch a barely controlled explosion.” During the mid-1960s the United States Air Force had both of its major piloted space projects, X-20 Dyna-Soar and Manned Orbiting Laboratory, canceled. This demonstrated its need to cooperate with NASA to place military astronauts in orbit. In turn, by serving Air Force needs, the Shuttle became a truly national system, carrying all military as well as civilian payloads. [3] Two designs emerged as front-runners. One was designed by engineers at the Manned Spaceflight Center, and championed especially by George Mueller. This was a two-stage system with delta-winged spacecraft, and generally complex. An attempt to re-simplify was made in the form of the DC-3, designed by Maxime Faget, who had designed the Mercury capsule among other vehicles. Numerous offerings from a variety of commercial companies were also offered but generally fell by the wayside as each NASA lab pushed for its own version. The NRC space station committee warned: “It is dangerous and misleading to assume there will be no losses and thus fail to plan for such events.”

Space Shuttle Diagrams - NASA History Space Shuttle Diagrams - NASA History

Grumman Aerospace Corporation; The Boeing Company (March 15, 1972). Space Shuttle System Program Definition - Phase B Extension - Final Report (PDF) (Technical report). NASA. hdl: 2060/19740022195. NASA-CR-134338. Archived (PDF) from the original on April 5, 2023. Statistically an airliner is the least risky form of transportation, which implies high reliability. And in the early 1970s, when President Richard M. Nixon, Congress, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) were all skeptical of the shuttle, proving high reliability was crucial to the program’s continued funding. Statistics don’t count for anything,” declared Will Willoughby, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s former head of reliability and safety during the Apollo moon landing program. “They have no place in engineering anywhere.” Now director of reliability management and quality assurance for the U.S. Navy, Washington, D.C., he still holds that risk is minimized not by statistical test programs, but by “attention taken in design, where it belongs.” His design-­oriented view prevailed in NASA in the 1970s, when the space shuttle was designed and built by many of the engineers who had worked on the Apollo program. Day, Dwayne A. (November 20, 2006). "The spooks and the turkey". The Space Review. Archived from the original on March 15, 2019. Editor’s Note: Today is the 30 th anniversary of the loss of the space shuttle Challenger, which was destroyed 73 seconds in its flight, killing all onboard. To mark the anniversary, IEEE Spectrum is republishing this seminal article which first appeared in June 1989 as part of a special report on risk. The article has been widely cited in both histories of the space program and in analyses of engineering risk management.

10 Comments

During the early shuttle studies, there was a debate over the optimal shuttle design that best-balanced capability, development cost, and operational cost. Initially, a fully reusable design was preferred. This involved a very large winged crewed booster which would carry a smaller winged crewed orbiter. The booster vehicle would lift the orbiter to a certain altitude and speed, then separate. The booster would return and land horizontally, while the orbiter continued into low Earth orbit. After completing its mission, the winged orbiter would re-enter and land horizontally on a runway. The idea was that full reusability would promote lower operating costs. Although the FMEA/CIL was first viewed as a design tool, NASA now uses it during operations and management as well, to analyze problems, assess whether corrective actions are effective, identify where and when inspection an d maintenance are needed, and reveal trends in failures.

Spaceship Free 3D Models download - Free3D Spaceship Free 3D Models download - Free3D

The probabilities originated in a series of quantitative risk assessments NASA was required to conduct by the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP), in anticipation of the launch of the Galileo spacecraft on its voyage to Jupiter, originally scheduled for the early 1980s. Galileo was powered by a plutonium-­fueled radioisotope thermoelectric generator, and Presidential Directive/NSC-25 ruled that either the U.S. President or the director of the office of science and technology policy must examine the safety of any launch of nuclear material before approving it. The INSRP (which consisted of representatives of NASA as the launching agency, the Department of Energy, which manages nuclear devices, and the Department of Defense, whose Air Force manages range safety at launch) was charged with ascertaining the quantitative risks of a catastrophic launch dispersing the radioactive poison into the atmosphere. There were a number of studies because the upper stage for boosting Galileo into interplanetary space was reconfigured several times. See also: Criticism of the Space Shuttle program and Space Shuttle retirement Early concept of how the Space Shuttle was to be serviced Despite the potential benefits for the Air Force, the military was satisfied with its expendable boosters and did not need or want the shuttle as much as NASA did. Because the space agency needed outside support, the Defense Department (DoD) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) gained primary control over the design process. For example, NASA planned a 40-by-12-foot (12.2 by 3.7m) cargo bay, but NRO specified a 60-by-15-foot (18.3 by 4.6m) bay because it expected future intelligence satellites to become larger. When Faget again proposed a 12ft (3.7m) wide payload bay, the military almost immediately insisted on retaining the 15ft (4.6m) width. The Air Force also gained the equivalent of the use of one of the shuttles for free despite not paying for the shuttle's development or construction. In exchange for the NASA concessions, the Air Force testified to the Senate Space Committee on the shuttle's behalf in March 1971. [4] :216,232–234 [5]As an example of how the “mindset” in the agency is now changing in favor of “a willingness to explore other things,” Buchbinder cited the new risk management program, the workshops it has been holding to train engineers and others in quantitative risk assessment techniques, and a new management instruction policy that requires NASA to “provide disciplined and documented management of risks throughout program life cycles.” Pincus, Walter (March 5, 1986). "NASA's Push to Put Citizen in Space Overtook Fully 'Operational' Shuttle". Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Archived from the original on August 2, 2017 . Retrieved July 14, 2020. It’s not that simple,” Buchbinder said. “A probabilistic way of thinking is not something that most people are attuned to. We don’t know what will happen precisely each time. We can only say what is likely to happen a certain percentage of the time.” Unless engineers and managers become familiar with probability theory, they don ’t know what to make of “large uncertainties that represent the state of current knowledge,” he said. “And that is no comfort to the poor decision-maker who wants a simple answer to the question, ‘Is this system safe enough? ’” By the early 1980s many figures were being quoted for the overall risk to the shuttle, with estimates of a catastrophic failure ranging from less than 1 chance in 100 to 1 chance in 100 000. “The higher figures [1 in 100] come from working engineers, and the very low figures [1 in 100 000] from management,” wrote physicist Richard P. Feynman in his appendix “Personal Observations on Reliability of Shuttle” to the 1986 Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. About: In my free time, I enjoy building/modifying/dismantling anything I can get my hands on. I am currently an engineering student at UCLA and look forward to sharing more projects with the Instructables community…

Free Space 3D Models | CGTrader Free Space 3D Models | CGTrader

Take the branch and saw off a part from the right tip to the intersection (in the case of my branch). One reason was economic. According to George Rodney, NASA’s associate administrator of safety, reliability, maintain­ability and quality assurance, it is not hard to get time and cycle data, “but it’s expensive and a big bookkeeping problem.”

Contact Us

One reason NASA has so strongly resisted probabilistic risk analysis may be the fact that “PRA runs against all traditions of engineering, where you handle reliability by safety factors,” said Elisabeth Paté-Cornell, associate professor in the department of industrial engineering and engineering management at Stanford University in California, who is now studying organizational factors and risk assessment in NASA. In addition, with NASA’s strong pride in design, PRA may be “perceived as an insult to their capabilities, that the system they ’ve designed is not 100 percent perfect and absolutely safe,” she added. Thus, the character of an organization influences the reliability and failure of the systems it builds because its structure, policy, and culture determine the priorities, incentives, and communication paths for the engineers and managers doing the work, she said. a b "Columbia Accident Investigation Board Public Hearing". Columbia Accident Investigaion Board Report (PDF) (Technical report). Vol.VI. Houston, Texas (published October 2003). April 23, 2003. pp.219–245. Archived (PDF) from the original on May 11, 2023. Wade, Mark. "Shuttle". Astronautix.com. Archived from the original on July 12, 2016 . Retrieved November 12, 2017.

Asda Great Deal

Free UK shipping. 15 day free returns.
Community Updates
*So you can easily identify outgoing links on our site, we've marked them with an "*" symbol. Links on our site are monetised, but this never affects which deals get posted. Find more info in our FAQs and About Us page.
New Comment