Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine

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Yes. I mean, in the sense that you could have a meltdown, radiation released. It’s not the same as a tactical nuclear weapon. It would create an emergency and again, you know, the Russians are in charge of this place. It’s their responsibility. And the vulnerability is not because of shelling. The vulnerability is because they’ve detached it from the grid and relying on diesel fuel to keep it going. If that runs out, there’s a problem. That’s where the issues are. So the remedies to make the thing safe, which so far they haven’t availed themselves of. So it’s a worrying situation. But again, it’s not one that I think would change the course of the war. Even now, six months into the war, Freedman struggles to understand the logic of the Kremlin, not least its tactic of creating a wintertime energy crisis in Europe to undermine support for Kyiv. There are no incentives to tell the truth on the ground to the higher command. They are all part of the inner circle Lawrence Freedman Letter Freedman wrote to John Chilcot explaining his role in the Chicago speech" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 18 April 2016. War, strategy, and international politics: essays in honour of Sir Michael Howard edited by Robert O'Neill, Lawrence Freedman, and Paul Hayes (1992); ISBN 0-19-822292-0

Lawrence Freedman: Command | The Spectator Lawrence Freedman: Command | The Spectator

You may also opt to downgrade to Standard Digital, a robust journalistic offering that fulfils many user’s needs. Compare Standard and Premium Digital here. Commanding is nevertheless a challenge, even if commands must be obeyed. In this broad survey of command in war since 1945, Lawrence Freedman brings to bear his extensive knowledge to explain the many complexities commanders at the highest level must now face, from grasping new ways of warfare to managing military organisation and supply and, above all, coping with the mercurial behaviour of their political masters. If there is a theme to Freedman’s book, which ranges from the Korean War to Putin’s ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine, it is to be found in the tensions and conflicts between military leaders and the politicians who call the shots that he documents. How often must a supreme commander have wished he were free to do what he wanted? Usually, politics has to be factored in. And I mean, obviously, this has been a fantastic week for the Ukrainians, but something like a fifth of their country is still occupied by Russia. How rapidly do you think they could make progress? And they talk about retaking Crimea. Do you think that is now on the agenda?

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Hello and welcome to the Rachman Review. I’m Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs commentator of the Financial Times. This week’s edition is about the stunning change in the war in Ukraine. The rapid advances by Ukrainian forces in the east of the country have changed the momentum of the conflict. Suddenly, Russian defeat looks like a real possibility. My guest this week is Sir Lawrence Freedman, emeritus professor of war studies at King’s College London and author of a new book, Command: The Politics of Military Operations From Korea to Ukraine. So, is this the beginning of the end of the war in Ukraine?

Command by Lawrence Freedman review – inside the war room

Ukrainian soldier speaking in foreign language] Izyum was, is and always will be Ukraine, says this soldier. [Ukrainian soldier shouting in foreign language] This is territory which Russia fought hard to take — lost in the space of days. Yeah. I mean, you mentioned there the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Is that really possibly the most dangerous potential flashpoint right now?

In a recent article, Lawrence Freedman argued that the events in Ukraine are of historic importance. So when I got him on the line from Washington, where he was doing the rounds, I asked Sir Lawrence why he thinks the current developments are indeed historic. Formatting and Grammar. I do not know if I simply had a rotten apple copy of this book but what I do know is that the grammar and formatting of sentences was, in some instances, atrocious. Whole sentences were joined together without spaces and I had to do a double take of countless sentences and paragraphs because I simply could not understand the way in which they were written. Whilst it did not detract from the content of the book, it certainly made the reading experience far less enjoyable.

Command by Lawrence Freedman | Goodreads Command by Lawrence Freedman | Goodreads

For cost savings, you can change your plan at any time online in the “Settings & Account” section. If you’d like to retain your premium access and save 20%, you can opt to pay annually at the end of the trial. And have the Ukrainians surprised you? They’ve certainly surprised the Russians. They’ve turned out to be a pretty effective fighting force and appear to be becoming more effective with the passing of time, unlike the Russians. Inevitably, this interaction is markedly different in western democracies than it is in totalitarian states. In the latter, the military command and the political power are the same thing – such as ­Khrushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis, or Saddam Hussein in the two Gulf wars, or (and this book is bang up to date) Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Freedman characterises such leaders as men (and they are inevitably all men) surrounded by sycophantic generals who have learnt that the best way to survive is to agree with everything the leader wishes to do.Another interesting factor lays in the personality traits of military and political leaders, and their ability to work together. As simple as this may seem to be, it is a condition for the success of a military campaign. A realistic definition of policy that is informed by military advice and the crafting of a military strategy which is tailored to the fulfilment of a policy are therefore two sides of the same coin. Freedman shows convincingly how the detachment of a war's political objectives from military realities often leads to operational failure, as do generals pursuing strategies in disregard of the political objectives/limits set by the government. Yeah, I think that’s an important distinction. I mean, the view was that a lot of your best units get used up and suffer in the early stages of the war. And certainly the Ukrainians lost quite a lot in the fighting in Luhansk and Donetsk in the summer. But I mean, they did mobilise, unlike the Russians, they are training people up. The UK’s got a big training centre now which I think there’s some evidence that may have made a difference. And they’re pretty determined people. So I think they have upped their game. They’re strategically quite canny and they’ve got the advantages of fighting on terrain they know and the real motivation. I mean, some of the forces facing them in Kharkiv were pretty cobbled together. It’s not as if they’re taking on the Russia of February. But that just indicates that they’ve played quite a clever strategic game themselves, first to stay in the war and then to turn the tables on the Russians. DeGroot, Gerard (13 December 2013). " 'Strategy: A History' by Lawrence Freedman". The Washington Post . Retrieved 24 November 2014.

Command: Individual or Collective? A Review of Anthony King’s Command: Individual or Collective? A Review of Anthony King’s

Yeah, they don’t have enough troops. They’re very thinly spread. They’ve avoided general mobilisation, although some people in Moscow are calling for that. I think it’s just too late. First, you’ve got to persuade people to come along. Secondly, somehow you’ve got to train them. They’re not going to be very inspired by veterans of this war telling them what awaits them. It takes you know weeks, months before you get them into the field. So they have to play now with very limited resources. They don’t seem able to move them around to different parts of the area of operations, nor do they seem to be using them very well. I think they just exhausted themselves in the summer, taking not a very large amount of Luhansk, which left them with a limited capacity to cope now.Using examples from a wide variety of conflicts, Lawrence Freedman shows that successful military command depends on the ability not only to use armed forces effectively but also to understand the political context in which they are operating.