The Ancient Greeks at War

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In 620, the Heraclius introduced Greek as the official language of the Empire. He also, adopted the Greek title of Basileus instead of the Latin Caesar, Augustus, or Imperator. The phalanx formed the core of ancient Greek militaries. Because hoplites were all protected by their own shield and others’ shields and spears, they were relatively safe as long as the formation didn't break. When advancing towards an enemy, the phalanx would break into a run that was sufficient to create momentum but not too much as to lose cohesion. [3] The opposing sides would collide viciously, possibly terrifying many of the hoplites of the front row. The battle would then rely on the valour of the men in the front line, while those in the rear maintained forward pressure on the front ranks with their shields. When in combat, the whole formation would consistently press forward trying to break the enemy formation; thus, when two phalanx formations engaged, the struggle essentially became a pushing match, [4] in which, as a rule, the deeper phalanx would almost always win, with few recorded exceptions.

Strassler, Robert B. ed (1996). The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War. London: Free Press. In the third phase of the war however the use of more sophisticated stratagems eventually allowed the Spartans to force Athens to surrender. Firstly, the Spartans permanently garrisoned a part of Attica, removing from Athenian control the silver mine which funded the war effort. Forced to squeeze even more money from her allies, the Athenian league thus became heavily strained. After the loss of Athenian ships and men in the Sicilian expedition, Sparta was able to foment rebellion amongst the Athenian league, which therefore massively reduced the ability of the Athenians to continue the war. Van der Heyden, A. A. M. and Scullard, H. H., (eds.), Atlas of the Classical World, London: Nelson, 1959. Campbell, Brian and Tritle, Lawrence A. eds. (2013). The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Another naval tactic used by the ancient Greeks was the periplous. The periplous consisted of the Greek navy "sailing around" the enemy's line. [16] Like the diekplous, the periplous' purpose was to expose the enemy's stern for an easy ramming target. [17] An example of this tactic is described by Thucydides during the second battle between the Athenians and Peloponnesians in the Gulf of Corinth. During this engagement, a single Athenian galley was being pursued by a Peloponnesian ship until the Athenian ship circled around a merchant ship and rammed the Peloponnesian vessel and sank it. [18] The Athenian ship was successful in this maneuver because it was the faster of the two ships, which is a key element in the periplous. [19] Olympias, a reconstruction of an ancient Athenian trireme, with bronze bow ram Ramming [ edit ] When exactly the phalanx was developed is uncertain, but it is thought to have been developed by the Argives in their early clashes with the Spartans. The chigi vase, dated to around 650 BC, is the earliest depiction of a hoplite in full battle array. The hoplite was a well-armed and armored citizen-soldier primarily drawn from the middle classes. Every man had to serve at least two years in the army. Fighting in the tight phalanx formation maximised the effectiveness of his armor, large shield and long spear, presenting a wall of armor and spear points to the enemy. They were a force to be for.

Sabin, Philip et al. eds. (2007). The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, 2 vols.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Opposition to it throughout the period 369–362 BC caused numerous clashes. In an attempt to bolster the Thebans' position, Epaminondas again marched on the Pelopennese in 362 BC. At the Battle of Mantinea, the largest battle ever fought between the Greek city-states occurred; most states were represented on one side or the other. Epaminondas deployed tactics similar to those at Leuctra, and again the Thebans, positioned on the left, routed the Spartans, and thereby won the battle. However, such were the losses of Theban manpower, including Epaminondas himself, that Thebes was thereafter unable to sustain its hegemony. Conversely, another defeat and loss of prestige meant that Sparta was unable to regain its primary position in Greece. Ultimately, Mantinea, and the preceding decade, severely weakened many Greek states, and left them divided and without the leadership of a dominant power. The war ended when the Persians, worried by the allies' successes, switched to supporting the Spartans, in return for the cities of Ionia and Spartan non-interference in Asia Minor. This brought the rebels to terms, and restored the Spartan hegemony on a more stable footing. The peace treaty which ended the war, effectively restored the status quo ante bellum, although Athens was permitted to retain some of the territory it had regained during the war. The Spartan hegemony would last another 16 years... The Ancient Greeks at War by Louis Rawlings is a wide-ranging and varied survey: it presents a clear and well-informed overview of key issues in the study of Greek warfare and of the modern controversies about them - though without extensive footnotes. Given the time period surveyed (1600 BC to 323 BC), the variety of ways of fighting and of thinking about war, and the difficulties of the evidence and the vast bibliography on the subject, this is an ambitious project. Rawlings wisely does not try to subordinate this sprawling topic to a single argument or theme; his overarching conclusion is merely that 'organized violence between Greek communities manifested itself in a variety of ways' (pp. 1, 224). Nevertheless, his treatment is lively and engaging throughout. Most impressive is the range of the topics he covers, from 'survivor's syndrome' to militarism, and from Ares to the cost of a trireme. Except for a smattering of small objections, I had only two serious reservations: in one important case Rawlings does not present contrary scholarly arguments accurately; some chapters suffered from chronological imprecision. Before turning to these issues, let me summarise the book's ten chapters and conclusion.

The second major challenge Sparta faced was fatal to its hegemony, and even to its position as a first-rate power in Greece. As the Thebans attempted to expand their influence over Boeotia, they inevitably incurred the ire of Sparta. After they refused to disband their army, an army of approximately 10,000 Spartans and Pelopennesians marched north to challenge the Thebans. At the decisive Battle of Leuctra (371 BC), the Thebans routed the allied army. The battle is famous for the tactical innovations of the Theban general Epaminondas. The history of the Classical fifth century BC was dominated by two wars: the Persian Wars and the Peloponnesian War. Culminating in the battles of Marathon, Thermopylae, and Salamis, the Persian Wars and their commemoration loomed large in Greek history and culture for many centuries. They contributed to the self-definition of Greeks vs. others; led to the rise of the Athenian Empire; and Alexander the Great would later set out on his conquest as a Greek war of revenge against the Persians. The Peloponnesian War, on the other hand, centred on the conflict between two Greek city-states, Athens and Sparta. Their lengthy period of strife reshaped the balance of power in the ancient Greek world, and led to the downfall of the Athenian empire. Two recent works provide substantial overviews of Greek warfare through the classical period on approximately the same scale and at the same level as Rawlings's book (readers may consult Hans van Wees, Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities or the relevant sections of the first volume of The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare. (9) The Cambridge History has the advantage of incorporating diverse scholarly perspectives, but it is predictably expensive. Hans van Wees's own book is obviously the best place to look for his seminal theories about the fluidity of the archaic phalanx and his emphasis on the pivotal role of state control and organisation in the intensification of Greek warfare. As we have seen, Rawlings summarises and endorses many of van Wees's ideas. Perhaps the greatest strength of his book is the extremely wide range of topics considered, their vivid and concrete treatment with the copious quotation of primary sources in translation and, finally, its generally high level of scholarship - my sundry criticisms notwithstanding. Notes Following the eventual defeat of the Athenians in 404 BC, and the disbandment of the Athenian-dominated Delian League, Ancient Greece fell under the hegemony of Sparta. The peace treaty which ended the Peloponnesian War left Sparta as the de facto ruler of Greece ( hegemon). Although the Spartans did not attempt to rule all of Greece directly, they prevented alliances of other Greek cities, and forced the city-states to accept governments deemed suitable by Sparta.This is when the mysterious Dorians invaded Greece. This is why it is named Dorian invasion. They still don't know what the Dorians' real name is. This is not classified as a war but it was still important in the Greeks' history. Building on the experience of the Persian Wars, the diversification from core hoplite warfare, permitted by increased resources, continued. There was increased emphasis on navies, sieges, mercenaries and economic warfare. Far from the previously limited and formalized form of conflict, the Peloponnesian War transformed into an all-out struggle between city-states, complete with atrocities on a large scale; shattering religious and cultural taboos, devastating vast swathes of countryside and destroying whole cities. [36] Important rituals had to be performed following victory which included the recovering of the dead and the setting up of a victory trophy (from tropaion, meaning turning point in the conflict) at the exact place on the battlefield where victory became assured. The trophy could be in the form of captured weapons and armour or an image of Zeus; on occasion memorials to the fallen were also set up. Speeches, festivals, sacrifices and even games could also be held following a victory in the field. Conclusion Pritchard, David M. (2010). War, Democracy, and Culture in Classical Athens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. This is a list of known wars, conflicts, battles/sieges, missions and operations involving ancient Greek city states and kingdoms, Magna Graecia, other Greek colonies ( First Greek colonisation, Second Greek colonisation, Greeks in pre-Roman Crimea, Greeks in pre-Roman Gaul, Greeks in Egypt, Greeks in Syria, Greeks in Malta), Greek Kingdoms of Hellenistic period, Indo-Greek Kingdom, Greco-Bactrian Kingdom, Byzantine Empire/ Byzantine Greeks, Byzantine Greek successor states of the Byzantine Empire, Kingdom of Greece and Greece between 3000 BC and the present day.

Nicholas Sekunda (25 December 2000). Greek Hoplite 480–323 BC. Bloomsbury USA. p.3. ISBN 978-1-85532-867-9. The Greek forces had/have mostly peacekeeping, humanitarian, logistics, reconstruction and support role The remainder of the wars saw the Greeks take the fight to the Persians. The Athenian dominated Delian League of cities and islands extirpated Persian garrisons from Macedon and Thrace, before eventually freeing the Ionian cities from Persian rule. At one point, the Greeks even attempted an invasion of Cyprus and Egypt (which proved disastrous), demonstrating a major legacy of the Persian Wars: warfare in Greece had moved beyond the seasonal squabbles between city-states, to coordinated international actions involving huge armies. After the war, ambitions of many Greek states dramatically increased. Tensions resulting from this, and the rise of Athens and Sparta as pre-eminent powers during the war led directly to the Peloponnesian War, which saw further development of the nature of warfare, strategy and tactics. The phalanx was an army tactic the Greeks performed with shields. Each soldier carried a shield in his left arm, which he used to protect both himself and the man on his left. [28] The depth of the phalanx differed depending on the battle and commander, but the width of the formation was considerably greater than its depth. [29] For example, during the battle of Syracuse, the depth of the Athenian army's phalanx was 8 men, while its opponent, the Syracusan army, had a depth of 16 men. [30] Melee [ edit ] Hoplite warfare [ edit ] Stele of Aristion, heavy-infantryman or hoplite. 510 BC. Top of helmet and pointed beard missing.

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Best, Jan G. P., Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on the Greek Warfare, Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1969. In 1460 the Ottomans conquered the Despotate of the Morea, in 1461 the Empire of Trebizond (the Akcakale castle captured by the Turks in 1467 though), in 1475 the Principality of Theodoro, in 1479 the Despotate of Epirus and by 1500 most of the plains and islands were in Ottoman hands. Holdouts included Rhodes, conquered in 1522, Cyprus in 1571, Crete, retained by the Venetians until 1669, and the Ionian islands which remained primarily under the rule of the Republic of Venice.