The Panzers of Prokhorovka: The Myth of Hitler’s Greatest Armoured Defeat

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Prokhorovka, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union 51°2′11″N 36°44′11″E / 51.03639°N 36.73639°E / 51.03639; 36.73639 Losses for 12 July are difficult to establish for either combatant. Tank losses attributed to the German side vary, [184] in part due to the Wehrmacht 's methodology for counting and reporting equipment losses. Only equipment that could not be repaired or that had to be abandoned were counted as losses, but damaged equipment that could be recovered and repaired were simply listed as such. [185] [186] Likewise, reliable figures for tank and personnel casualties for the Red Army in the Battle of Prokhorovka are difficult to establish. [187] German [ edit ] There have been various estimates of the geographical extent of the battle as a whole, but the tank battle was not only at the heart of Prokhorovka, but the very reason for the fame and mythology attached to it, and there seems no reason not to accept Frieser’s revisionism, supported by Wheatley’s close analysis of the Luftwaffe photographs. This raises the question of why generations of Western historians have repeated Soviet claims as to the number of German tanks destroyed.

The Panzers of Prokhorovka, by Ben Wheatley The Panzers of Prokhorovka, by Ben Wheatley

Comparing Soviet and German archives, the total number of tanks and other heavy armoured fighting vehicles such as assault guns and self-propelled guns deployed by the 5th Guards Tank Army and the II SS-Panzer Corps around Prokhorovka during the battle numbered only about 910. [104] The II SS-Panzer Corps never had the number of tanks and assault guns attributed to it by Soviet estimates at any point during Operation Citadel, [129] not even at the start when it fielded only 494. [209] Even if the definition of the battle was broadened to include the III Panzer Corps and the portion of the 5th Guards Tank Army that faced it, the total number of tanks and other heavy armoured fighting vehicles comes out at a maximum of 1,299. [104] In contrast, for example, the Battle of Brody during Operation Barbarossa involved over 2,000 tanks, up to 6,000 tanks over the duration of the battle, engaged in combat over a 70-kilometre (43mi) front. [210] [211] Nonetheless, the Battle of Prokhorovka is still regarded as one of the largest tank battles in military history. Wilson, Alan. "Kursk and Prokhorovka, July 1943 (maps)". Archived from the original on 20 April 2012 . Retrieved 19 June 2013. Archival data of the II SS-Panzer Corps shows that the corps had 294 operable tanks and assault guns on the evening of 11 July, and 251 on the evening of 13 July. [77] Allowing for the possibility that some repaired tanks were returned to service on 13 July, these numbers indicate that at least 43 tanks and assault guns became inoperable during this period, which includes all ten Tigers belonging to Totenkopf and one belonging to Leibstandarte. [191] An estimated total of 60–80 tanks and assault guns of the II SS-Panzer Corps were damaged or destroyed in combat on 12 July. [192] [193] By the end of 16 July, the II SS-Panzer Corps had 292 serviceable tanks and assault guns, almost the same number it had at the beginning of the battle on 12 July. [194] On 12 July, Schlachtgeschwader 1 of the 8th Air Corps reported 11 aircraft damaged, all by Soviet anti-aircraft artillery, of which 6 were total write-offs. [6] Soviet [ edit ] Destroyed Soviet T-34, 1943 It was certainly one of the greatest tank battles of the war, but the claim that it was the greatest has been challenged by American historian David Glantz and Russian historian Valeriy Zamulin. Both have argued that the Battle of Brody, in June 1941, involved more tanks, and was of greater importance, putting an end to Hitler’s hopes of defeating the Soviet Union in a short war. Barbier, Mary Kathryn (2002). Kursk: The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943. St. Paul, MN: MBI Publishing Company. ISBN 978-0-7603-1254-4.

Whether or not Wheatley is correct in thinking that ‘had the Nazi leadership held its nerve, then Manstein’s Operation Roland would have probably been successful’ as ‘there is no reason to suppose the trend of armoured combat would not have continued’ is debateable. On the other hand, he accepts that even a further reduction in the Red Army’s strike capacity would not have enabled the Germans to redress the overall strategic situation on the Eastern Front. Kursk: a decisive turning-point? Overy, Richard (1997). Russia's War: A History of the Soviet Effort. New York: Penguin Books. ISBN 0-14-027169-4.

Book sends tale of Soviet tank victory up in smoke

This is a widely accepted view, of course, but to my mind The Panzers of Prokhorovka does not provide enough context to bridge the gap between the minuscule numbers of tanks lost at a tactical level in one battle and the vast array of destruction that epitomised the wider Eastern Front. Ben Wheatley joins a very select crew of superb historians who have turned the received wisdom on its head. He has transformed what we thought we knew about history's greatest tank battle. This is a fearless commitment to scholarship, to analysing the evidence wherever it may lead.

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The 23rd Guards Rifle Corps bore the brunt of the German offensive from the very first day. Its subordinate units present at the Battle of Prokhorovka were already depleted ( Glantz & House 2004, pp.94, 167). It has been accorded great significance in Soviet and post-Soviet Russian history. Although considered a stalemate in which both Russian and German forces suffered enormous losses, the German tank loss was supposedly so great that Prokhorovka is thought to have played a major part in the outcome of the wider Battle of Kursk. Expanding the battle beyond Prokhorovka, the total number of tanks fielded by the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army at and near the battle amounted to 1,299, according to a statistical analysis published in 2000 by Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson. It was a desperate venture, for it drew on the greater part of the German operational reserve. Former general and then historian Friedrich von Mellenthin has called it a ‘veritable death- ride’.