Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars

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Whilst discussing some post World War 2 technological developments the authors generally avoid assessments arguing that the technologies have not been tested in major power conflict in more recent years, and hence accurate data is not available to sustain valid assessments. Having made these observations the authors nevertheless do make some broad statements on current capabilities. In relation to submarines, it is concluded that: “There is reason to think that they would be even more effective now, given the relative states of submarine and ASW technology.” In relation to the torpedo, the authors conclude that: “It is likely to be a part of naval arsenals for years to come and to experience more permutations before the concept is finally obsolete.” In relation to naval aviation the authors conclude that: “It is difficult to know whether the carrier has had its day, but the current crop of antiship weapons give little cause for optimism. Navies will still require wings, but those wings may well prove to be of a new type (such as unmanned drones) flying from new platforms rather than large, expensive aircraft flying from large, expensive ships.” Demand for Victory’s cordless electrostatic sprayers has grown significantly since the company’s founding in 2014, and recently saw a dramatic increase as a result of COVID-19. Carlyle’s investment will accelerate Victory’s growth trajectory, including its planned expansion in key global markets in Asia, Europe, Latin America and Africa.

Given the limitations of the cases presented here, the authors did a commendable job of creating an accessible and readable volume that points out some potential pitfalls to avoid and techniques for developing technological advantage in wartime. The target audience is not the Department of Defense Acquisition Professional or the cadre of doctrine writers who will not be surprised by any of the book’s findings. Military enthusiasts, whether professional or amateur, however, will enjoy the book and should add it to their military history library. Each chapter discusses when and where the technologies were first developed, when it was used in war and what navies expected of it. It also traces the evolution of each technology and how it was eventually used compared to navies original intentions. Development of the technology in different navies is examined as is its employment in time of conflict, mainly during the Russo-Japanese War, World War 1 and World War 2. Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars by Vincent P. O’Hara and Leonard R. Heinz. Naval Institute Press, 2022, 336 pp. Vincent P. O’Hara is the author or co-author of more than 10 books, mainly on topics of World War I and II naval warfare. In this latest book, Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars, O’Hara has teamed up with Leonard Heinz, an experienced designer of wargames and simulations with emphasis on tactical naval problems. The authors use their expertise to explore six case studies that analyze technological developments in the twentieth century. New technologies bring new vulnerabilities. Radar and Active sonar emit sound waves that can detect and be detected by the enemy. Computer based systems whilst bringing efficiencies in operations, also expose users to increasing levels of vulnerability.

Vincent OHara

The admirals who developed fleet tactics were busy men with little time to explore the possibilities of untested technology. They used their platforms in the way they knew best. Accepting new technology and integrating it into the naval tool chest were neither natural nor easy processes; doing so was risky and took conscious effort and dedication from advocates and supporters in the highest places. The ruthless pressures of war brought out the true capabilities of technologies. Under wartime conditions, apparently weak technologies such as mines could completely transform the use and even the raison d’être of an alpha technology, the dreadnought battleship. Even an alpha technology must be open to innovative use if it is to remain relevant. Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars studies how the world's navies incorporated new technologies into their ships, their practices, and their doctrine. It does this by examining six core technologies fundamental to twentieth-century naval warfare including new platforms (submarines and aircraft), new weapons (torpedoes and mines), and new tools (radar and radio). Each chapter considers the state of a subject technology when it was first used in war and what navies expected of it. It then looks at the way navies discovered and developed the technology's best use, in many cases overcoming disappointed expectations. It considers how a new technology threatened its opponents, not to mention its users, and how those threats were managed.

By 1914, with combat governed by caution, the capital ship’s strategic function had come to dominate its tactical function. Basically, because cost had escalated to the point where relatively few nations could afford to construct capital ships in any quantity, their primary function became to exist rather than to fight. Their very existence in superior numbers was enough to guarantee sea control. There was no point in fighting. This strategic aspect of the dreadnought revolution, as expressed in World War I, caught navies by surprise when it was recognized at all.Schools and hospitals were among the first to adopt Victory’s technology, followed by an increasing number of other businesses and industries, from airlines and hotels to gyms and professional sports. The difference between the 104-gun first rate ship of the line HMS Victory of 1805 and HMS Dreadnought of 1905 is a clear example of technological progress, but where is the innovation? If the capital ship represents a synthesis of many technologies, then one can easily argue that behind the technological progress that produced this synthesis, there was profound innovation. This is true if one considers only technical innovation. One can ask whether these innovations were driven by militaries or by society in general. For example, the steam engine transformed naval warfare, but first it transformed transportation and manufacturing in general and in the process changed the world economy. Society at large and not the military drove many of the improvements in steam technology. The same is true of electromagnetic technology and even of advances in the sciences of metallurgy and chemistry that had direct applications to armor and explosives. Militaries generally regard the goal of technological innovation as a matter of progressive improvement in a proven field: larger guns firing bigger shells to greater ranges, for example. In general, navies strive to win wars with better versions of existing weapons, tools, and platforms rather than use novelties in the front line. But the greatest power of new technology comes from innovative use. What are these improved guns being fired at, and to what purpose? If they are used in the same old way, it is legitimate to repeat the question that opened this paragraph: Where is the innovation? A theme that runs throughout the book is the idea of network effects. One radio is a novelty. Many radios in a network allow rapid communications for a variety of tasks and common understanding of the situation. Other technologies are similar. For instance, many radio direction-finding antennas provide more accurate locations and greater resilience against damage. Many mines are far more effective in constraining ship movement than a few that can be avoided. If Germany had fielded 50 more submarines when World War II began, the outcome may have been quite different. The limited application of technology produces a small effect, but massive proliferation produces a great effect.

Cover: Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars by Vincent P. Ohara and Leonard R. Heinz INNOVATING VICTORY Victory smiles upon those who anticipate changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur. Vipul Amin, a Managing Director at The Carlyle Group, said, “As more and more businesses grasp the need to not just clean surfaces, but disinfect them, we see tremendous growth opportunity for Victory. Their highly effective technologies are more cost effective, use less disinfectant and operate faster than alternative disinfecting methods. We look forward to working alongside the co-founders and the entire Victory team as we support their continued expansion.” valuable.” —Norman Friedman, author of U.S. Submarines Through 1945: An Illustrated Design History “O'Hara and Heinz are to be congratulated on a fine book about

Animals fight with horns, teeth, and claws. Humans can bite and scratch as well, but to win, they use technology. The word technology is a compound of two Greek roots, tekhne (craft) and logia (learning). In essence, technology is the practical application of knowledge expressed through the use of a device. Submarines and aircraft. These platforms allowed navies to operate in new environments below and above the surface of the sea, confounding existing weapons and tactics and expanding the scope of naval warfare. Overall, the book provides useful insights from its analysis and discussion of key tecnological developments during the first half of the 20th century. It also provides some stimulus for consideration by those planning the future of navies, in an inceasingly complex and challenging world. One of the key messages from the book is the need for a combination of scientists and specialists to work in collaboration with the end users to ensure a successful and effective outcome. New technologies do not materialize fully functional as from Aladdin’s lamp. History shows that a successful technology undergoes a process: invention, development, acceptance, deployment, and then a cycle of discovery, evolution, and exploitation. The capstone of this process is determining the technology’s best uses and then combining those with best practices for best results. In every case, the goal is a combat advantage. In 1904, 1914, and 1939, navies went to war with unproven technologies and experienced steep learning curves in trying to match expectations with practical and effective use. Should war break out tomorrow, the learning curve will be even steeper.